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DOES A PATENT REASSIGNMENT
REMEDY FOR TECHNOLOGY
MISAPPROPRIATION LEAVE THE TRUE
INVENTOR HOLDING AN EMPTY BAG?
Incerta pro nullis habentur.1
Deeply rooted in the patent laws2 is the originality require-
ment,3 which precludes the issuance of a valid patent 4 to an entity
I See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 761 (6th ed. 1990) ("Uncertain things are held for
nothing.").
2See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent laws and the strict inventorship require-
ments therein are founded upon article I of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have the Power... [t]o promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries." Id. Section
101 of the patent law gives effect to this constitutional patent grant by providing that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
for." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988) (stating
that person entitled to patent unless "he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to
be patented"); ROBERT L. HARmON, PATENTS AND TiE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 3.3, at 51 (2d ed.
1991) (noting "fundamental principle" of American patent law that "you cannot patent an-
other's invention").
The constitutional grant of authority has classically been viewed as mandating that pat-
ents be granted only to inventors for their own discoveries. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE
LAW OF PATENTS § 363, at 522 (1890) (acknowledging that "[w]ithout a change in the lan-
guage of the Constitution, no patent could be conferred except upon an inventor, and for his
own invention or discovery").
' See I DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALID-
ITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 2.01, at 2-1 to 2-2 (1992). The originality requirement serves to
prevent an entity from obtaining a patent based on a conception that was derived from
some other source. Id.; see also Grain Prods., Inc. v. Lincoln Grain, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 177, 193 (S.D. Ind. 1976) (emphasizing that originality requires that patents issue on
application of correct entity). This requirement, limiting patent monopolies to those entities
that "actually expend inventive effort in a successful fashion," protects the true inventor as
well as the public. 1 CassuM, supra, § 2.01, at 2-2.
The originality requirement, which encourages participation by the true inventor, also
serves to reinforce other substantive requirements of patentability. See id. at 2-2. Since the
true inventor of a new invention is typically aware of developments relating to his invention,
including public use or disclosure, he is an important source of information as to whether
the invention is patentable. Id. Additionally, participation by the inventor ensures that the
patent application ihcludes the complete and accurate description of the inventor's discov-
ery. See Mary H. Sears, The Corporate Patent-Reform or Retrogression, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 380, 380 (1979). Accordingly, the public receives all that it is entitled to in exchange
for the patent monopoly. Id. at 380-81.
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that has derived 5 the invention from another.6 Accordingly, patents
An outgrowth of the originality requirement is the rule of proper joinder of inventors. 1
CHISUM, supra, § 2.03, at 2-22. The originality requirement is violated where there has been
a failure to name a true co-inventor (nonjoinder), where a party was improperly named as a
co-inventor (misjoinder), and where there has been a complete mistake in the naming of the
inventor. Id. Fortunately, errors that occur in the naming of the inventive entity without
deceptive intention may be corrected pursuant to statutory authority. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 116,
256 (1988). Furthermore, such errors shall not affect the validity of the patent. Id. at § 256.
For a discussion of the inventorship correction provisions see infra part II.
The originality requirement is also applicable to copyrights as well. See 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1988) (stating that "[c]opyright protection exists ... in original works of authorship").
However, a copyright holder, unlike a patentee, does not have any rights or remedies against
a person who independently creates an exact duplicate of the copyright holder's work. See 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01[A], at 8-13 (1992).
' See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) (stating that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid"). Under
§ 282, the burden is on the person challenging patent validity. See, e.g., American Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984). Invalidity must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and the burden of prov-
ing validity never shifts from the challenger. Id.
The presumption of validity encompasses three aspects of patentability: novelty, utility
and nonobviousness. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707,
714 (Fed. Cir. 1984); accord J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY 256 (1991)[hereinafter MCCARTHY, ENCYCLOPEDIA]. This presumption
of patent validity includes a presumption that the named patentees are the inventors of the
patented invention. See General Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co. 667 F.2d 504, 507 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982); John 0. Tresansky, Inventorship Determina-
tion, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 551, 553-54 (1974).
5 See MCCARTHY, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 89. Derivation occurs where a party
applies for a patent on an invention that was taken from another, id., and requires the
communication of a prior, complete conception of the claimed subject matter to the party
charged with derivation. See Hedgewick v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see
also Mark J. Buonaiuto, Comment, The Use of Derived Information as Prior Art Under
Section 103 of the Patent Act, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 427-28 (1984) (addressing whether
derived information may properly be considered as prior art for purposes of § 103 nonobvi-
ousness inquiry).
The Supreme Court, in Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1868), established
the standard for determining whether the communication to the party charged with deriva-
tion was sufficient to defeat patentability. Id. at 602-03. The Court stated:
[the] [s]uggestions from another.., in order that they may be sufficient to defeat
a patent subsequently issued, must have embraced the plan of the improvement,
and must have furnished such information to the person to whom the communica-
tion was made that it would have enabled an ordinary mechanic, without the exer-
cise of any ingenuity and special skill on his part, to construct and put the im-
provement in successful operation.
Id. Accordingly, to rise to the level of derivation, the communicated idea must be a specific
means of accomplishing a desired result, not merely an identification of the desired end or
result. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 10.04, at 10-48. Additionally, the idea must be suffi-
ciently developed so as to allow anyone of "ordinary skill in the art" to reduce it to practice.
Id.
Although the rule against derivation prevents a person from patenting an invention
that has been derived from another, the rule does not prevent an inventor from "'using the
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claiming misappropriated technology' that have issued in the name
of an improper entity' have consistently been invalidated by the
services, ideas, and aid of others in the process of perfecting his invention.'" Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed. Cir.) (quoting Hobbs v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1971)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 976
(1985).
6 See DAviD A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK TACTICS AND PRACTICE § 4-3, at 37 (2d
ed. 1984). An inventor that has derived his invention from another is not entitled to a pat-
ent. Id.; see also 1 ERNEST B. LipscomB 11, LipscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 3.2, at 183 (3d
ed. 1984) (explaining that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless they did not invent
the subject matter sought to be patented).
To be considered an "inventor" under the patent laws, a party must be responsible for
a development that falls within the scope of the statutory definition of invention, i.e., the
inventor must have discovered something new, useful and unobvious. See, e.g., Edward G.
Greive, Note, The Doctrine of Inventorship: Its Ramifications in Patent Law, 17 W. RES. L.
REV. 1342, 1344 (1966) (addressing law of inventorship).
The threshold inquiry to be addressed in naming the inventors of a patent is who "con-
ceived" the invention. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357,
1372 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973). Without a contribution to the
"conception" of the invention, a person is not an inventor. Id. "Conception" has been de-
fined as the "'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of
the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.'"
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting
Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
Although the 1984 amendments to the patent laws "liberalized" some procedural as-
pects of the law of inventorship, the substantive determinations remain the same. See 4
IRVING KAYTON ET AL., PATENT PRACTICE 16-1 (4th ed. 1989). The amendments did not alter
the "inviolate rule" that only those that actually "invent" as it has been traditionally deter-
mined can "wear the mantle of 'inventor.'" Id.
The legislative history accompanying the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116 confirms
that the amendment was not "intended to permit anyone other than the inventor to be
named in a patent application or patent. Also, the amendment is not intended to enable
appropriation of the invention of another." SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS: PATENT LAW
AMENDMENTS OF 1984 (1984), 138 CONG. REc. 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5834.
See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:25,
at 396 (2d ed. 1984)[hereinafter MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS]. Misappropriation is a common
law action providing relief where a misappropriator has copied or appropriated an item or
creation of the plaintiff that is not protected intellectual property. See McCARTHY, ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 206; see also Roy E. Hofer & John M. Wagner, Anatomy of a
Misappropriation: Edward M. Goldberg, M.D. v. Medtronic, Inc., 26 IDEA 145, 145 (1985)
(acknowledging rise of misappropriation of ideas and analyzing case of misappropriation of
pacemaker technology).
There are three elements that must be established to succeed under a claim of misap-
propriation. 1 McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra, § 10:25, at 396. First, the plaintiff must have
made a substantial investment of time, effort, and money in the misappropriated property.
Id. Secondly, the defendant must have appropriated the property at little or no cost. Id.
Finally, the defendant's acts must have injured the plaintiff. Id.
8 See 1 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 2.0311], at 2-23. An inventive entity comprised of joint
inventors is a "separate and distinct" inventive entity from the individual inventors com-
prising the group. Id.
In this manner, a patent that names less than all of the joint inventors of an inventive
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federal courts. Since such patents are considered "unauthorized
by law, and void,"' 0 courts have historically denied requests to as-
sign them to the true inventive entity." Therefore, the true inven-
tor is often left without a patent-related remedy.'2 Recently, how-
ever, in Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,13 the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ordered a misappropriator to assign all pat-
ents received on a misappropriated invention to the true inven-
tors, 4 notwithstanding the apparent invalidity of the patents for
entity is subject to a declaration of invalidity. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988).
There are generally five possible combinations or types of erroneous inventorship. See 4
KAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-5 to 16-6. In "case I," inventor A is the named inventor,
while inventor B is the true inventor. Id. In "case II," known as "nonjoinder," A is the
named inventor, while both A and B are the true joint inventors. Id. In "case III," known as
"misjoinder," both A and B are the named inventors, while A alone is the true inventor. Id.
In "case IV," which is a combination of nonjoinder and misjoinder, both A and B are the
named inventors, while A and C are the true joint inventors. Id. Finally, in "case V," both A
and B are the named inventors, while C and D are the true joint inventors. Id. Cases I and
V involve complete mistakes in the naming of the inventive entity, as no true inventor is
originally named. Id.; see also BURGE, supra note 6, at 37-38 (discussing misjoinder, nonjoin-
der, and misdesignation of inventorship).
9 See, e.g., Cummings v. Moore, 202 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1953) (voiding patent
based on appropriated invention issued to one not true inventor); Koehring Co. v. E.D.
Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334, 359-60 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (same); Koehring Co. v. National
Automatic Tool Co., 257 F. Supp. 282, 289 (S.D. Ind. 1966) (same), aff'd, 385 F.2d 414 (7th
Cir. 1967); see also Gotz v. Universal Prods. Co., 107 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1939) (invalidating
patent granted to one who falsely swore that he was first and true inventor).
Patent invalidity provides infringers with a defense for patent infringement. See 5
CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.01, at 19-4. Although a duly issued patent is presumed valid, an
alleged infringer will avoid liability by establishing that the patent is invalid. Id. If the
challenger succeeds in challenging patent validity, the court will declare the patent invalid.
MCCARTHY, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 256. The court's invalidity determination will
collaterally estop the patentee from enforcing the same patent claims. Id.
10 See Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888). Patents that are "not supported
by the oath of the inventor, but applied for by one who is not the inventor, [are] unautho-
rized by law, and void." Id.
11 See, e.g., Friedman v. Washburn Co., 145 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1944) (stating that
error occurs where courts assign patents based on appropriated invention naming improper
inventor); Koehring v. National Automatic, 257 F. Supp. at 289 (same); accord Tracerlab,
Inc. v. Indus. Nucleonics Corp., 204 F. Supp. 101, 104 (D. Mass. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 313 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1963); Grindle v. Welch, 146 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (N.D. Cal.
1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1957); Crook v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 68 F. Supp. 449,
449-50 (D. Del. 1946).
12 See infra part I.A.; see also Kennedy, 128 U.S. at 673 (requiring plaintiff to seek
"any remedy that he may have to recover damages in an action at law" since action for title
could not be maintained); Friedman, 145 F.2d at 718 (noting that although patent reassign-
ment unavailable true inventor not confined to patent laws for relief from misappropriator).
13 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
14 Id. at 1249-50.
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failing to name the proper inventor.15
In ordering the patent assignment, the Federal Circuit explic-
itly stated that it was not addressing the issue of improper in-
ventorship. 6 The court simply held that, as against the misap-
propriator, the true inventor was entitled to ownership of the
patents." It is submitted that, after Suzuki, the validity of the as-
signed patents, although questionable, has yet to be considered.' 8
This Note will analyze the remedy of assigning a patent based
on misappropriated technology to the true inventor, when the pat-
ent has issued in the name of the misappropriator or another im-
proper entity. Part One will briefly evaluate the inventorship de-
fects inherent in such patents and will consider how these defects
affect the validity and ability to assign them. Part Two will con-
sider whether these defects may be cured under the correction pro-
visions of the patent statute in light of the recent trend toward
more liberal allowance of inventorship correction. Finally, Part
Three will assert that under the present statutory scheme the as-
signment of such patents to the true inventor fails to provide a
reliable remedy and, alternatively, will propose various approaches
that will provide the true inventor with more adequate relief.
15 Id. at 1249 (finding that it was not "significantly disputed" at trial that claims 1
through 8 of the defendant's patent improperly claimed the invention of plaintiff).
18 Id. (emphasizing that "[tihe correction of inventorship is an administrative step, and
is not before the court"); see also Donald S. Chisum, The Seventh Annual Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 566
(1989) (explaining that Suzuki "emphasized that an assignment to correct a wrongdoing is a
distinct step from a determination of inventorship, that is, correction of the patent.").
17 Suzuki, 868 F.2d at 1249.
1" The parties in Suzuki did not raise the issue of validity with respect to the misappro-
priated patents. See Corrected Appellant's Opening Brief at 39-42, Suzuki (Appeal Nos. 87-
1497, 87-1498, 87-1502, 88-1083, 88-1084); Brief for Cross Appellant at 45-47, Suzuki (Ap-
peal Nos. 87-1497, 87-1498, 87-1502, 88-1083, 88-1084); Corrected Appellants Reply Brief at
30-31 n.58, Suzuki (Appeal Nos. 87-1497, 87-1498, 87-1502, 88-1083, 88-1084). Moreover,
federal courts are unable to rule on the validity of the claims of a patent that have not been
put in issue by the parties. See 5 Cmsubi, supra note 3, § 19.0214], at 19-16; see also Lan-
nom Mfg. Co., v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasizing
that a district court may not invalidate a patent on its own initiative where patent validity
has not been challenged by a party); Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 296 (2d
Cir. 1975) (asserting that a court cannot address the validity of claims not put in issue);
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genetech, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1547, 1549 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (stating that court may only determine validity of claims where infringement is al-
leged), rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cr. 1991). But see Hieger v. Ford Motor Co., 516
F.2d 1324, 1327 (6th Cir. 1975) (urging expungement of invalid patents wherever possible to
permit full and free competition in the use of ideas in the public domain), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1056 (1976).
1993]
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I. EFFECT OF INVENTORSHIP DEFECTS ON VALIDITY AND ABILITY TO
ASSIGN A PATENT BASED ON MISAPPROPRIATED TECHNOLOGY
To protect the interests of true inventors, as well as the pub-
lic, patents must only be granted on application, supported by
oath, 19 of the true inventor.2 0 The inventorship defects 21 present in
a patent based on misappropriated technology affect the basic in-
tegrity of the oath;22 accordingly, courts are more concerned with
these defects than with inventorship defects that arise from mere
errors in judgment as to the identity of the inventive entity.23
Moreover, the willful naming of an improper entity, as here, con-
stitutes grounds for invalidation of the patent.24
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). "The applicant shall make oath that he believes himself
to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or improvement thereof, for which he solicits a patent . . . ." Id. This oath is an
essential aspect of patent validity. See 1 LipscoMP, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 184; see also
Standard Oil Dev. Co. v. James B. Berry Sons Co., 92 F.2d 386, 388 (3d Cir. 1937) (invali-
dating patent unsupported by oath of true inventor).
Congress has provided three exceptions to the requirement that the true inventor must
execute the oath. See 35 U.S.C. § 118 (filing on behalf of inventor and in his name by one
having proprietary interest); id. § 117 (permitting filing by legal representatives of inventors
who are deceased or legally incapacitated); id. § 116 (allowing joint inventor to sign on be-
half of himself and co-inventor where co-inventor is unwilling or unavailable); see also Don-
ald G. Daus, A. F. Stoddard & Co., Ltd. v. Dann: A Doctrine of Innocence, 7 AM. INTELL.
PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 130, 137 (1979). Regardless of who executes the oath, it must identify
the true inventive entity. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.63(a)(3), 1.64 (1991); accord 4 KAYrON ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 16-5 (noting that although the number of persons who may file applications
has been enlarged, application must identify true inventors).
In order for an improper oath to invalidate a patent, the oath must constitute a fraud
upon the patent office. See Akiebolag v. Waukesha Cutting Tools Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2002, 2004 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (requiring some fraud to strike a patent application and invali-
date the ensuing patent); Raytek, Inc. v. Solfon Sys., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405, 407
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (same).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he
did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented . . . ."); accord Mead Digital
Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 723 F.2d 455, 466 n.16 (6th Cir. 1983); Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp. v. Nitto Boseki Co., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1983); see also supra note 8
(discussing inventive entities).
21 See supra note 8 (discussing five types of inventorship defects).
22 See 2 MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 2.10[2.-1], at 2-1172.10 (2d
ed. 1991).
23 See id. (noting that courts are more concerned with derivation errors than with mis-
joinder and nonjoinder errors, since derivation errors go to the "basic integrity" of the oath,
while errors of misjoinder and nonjoinder are merely errors in judgment as to the identity of
the inventors).
24 See Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 513 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting
that false inventorship claims will invalidate patent); Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman
& Sons, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1059, 1068 (D. Del. 1983) (invalidating patent for deliber-
ate non-joinder of coinventor to gain private advantage) (dicta), aff'd in part, 750 F.2d 1552
1152 [Vol. 66:1147
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The Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Hazelton,2 5 held that a
patent applied for by one other than the true inventor is invalid
and thus confers no rights of title as against the public.2 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that such a patent could not be assigned to
the rightful party "because its only possible value or use ... would
be to enable [the assignee] to impose upon the public by asserting
rights under a void patent. '27 As a result, the Court found that the
only remedy available to the plaintiff was an action to recover
damages.28
The Court's holding in Kennedy has been repeatedly invoked
by federal courts to preclude assignment to the true inventor of
patents based on misappropriated technology that issue in the
name of improper entities. 29 State courts, however, using their au-
thority to determine matters of ownership and title,30 traditionally
have ordered the assignment of such patents to the true inventor.3 1
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Ashlow Ltd. v. Morgan Constr. Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 671, 697 (D.S.C.
1982) (asserting that the willful naming of an incorrect entity will invalidate patent); see
also 1 Lipscor.m, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 190 (explaining that patents granted to entity that
falsely swore it was true inventor are invalid).
25 128 U.S. 667 (1888).
28 Id. at 672. In Kennedy, the plaintiff sought an assignment of a patent where the
defendant had agreed in writing to assign to the plaintiff any patents he receives on im-
provements to an invention. Id. at 671. After inventing an improvement within the scope of
the assignment agreement, and with intent to defraud the plaintiff by avoiding the agree-
ment, the defendant procured a patent on the improvement naming a third party as the
inventor. Id.
17 Id. at 672. The Court found that according to the plaintiff's own showing, the patent
was invalid and conferred no rights or title upon the defendant. Id.
28 Id. at 673; see also infra part III.B. for a discussion of the non-patent remedies that
are available to a true inventor.
219 See supra note 11.
20 See 6 CHIsuM, supra note 3, § 22.03[4], at 22-49 (stating that state law generally
governs ownership rights in patents). Notwithstanding exclusive federal jurisdiction over
claims arising under the patent laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988), state courts may try questions
of patent ownership and may enforce contracts relating to patents. See New Marshall En-
gine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 478 (1912); see also Heath v. Zenkich, 437
N.E.2d 675, 679 (Ill. App. 1982) (noting that actions for determination of patent ownership
arise independent of federal patent law); Edwards v. Gramling Eng'g Corp., 588 A.2d 793,
802-03 (Md.) (explaining that issues of equitable ownership of patents can be tried by state
court), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 317 (1991); Zemba v. Rodgers, 210 A.2d 95, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1965) (holding that state court had subject matter jurisdiction over suit involving patent
ownership since matter is independent of federal patent laws).
32 See Heath, 437 N.E.2d at 679 (permitting patent assignment by state court); Ed-
wards, 588 A.2d at 802-03 (allowing assignment of patents to remedy breach of fiduciary
duty); Zemba, 210 A.2d at 99 (same); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 272 N.Y.S.2d
600, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (ordering former employee to assign to employer patent applica-
tions embodying "striking description" of employer's trade secrets).
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Although state courts can order a patent assignment without ad-
dressing the issue of patent validity,32 any state court assignment
to the true inventor of such a patent may be a valueless assign-
ment since a federal court may subsequently declare the patent
invalid. 3 Since a true inventor must proceed to a federal court for
correction of inventorship 4 and for enforcement of the assigned
patent against an infringer, 5 it is submitted that state courts
should be cautious in granting a remedy that has a value that is
uncertain 6 and beyond their control.
In light of the federal courts' tradition of refusing to assign
invalid patents, the patent reassignment remedy in Suzuki3 7 was
"unusual, if not unprecedented.13  Although the Federal Circuit
32 See Edwards, 588 A.2d at 802 (explaining that issues of patent validity need not
arise in suit of patent ownership); Zemba, 210 A.2d at 99 (noting that "[s]tate courts are
free to render judgements... which would logically void the patent in an appropriate suit in
the federal courts").
33 See Becher v. Contoure Lab., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391-92 (1929); Zemba, 210 A.2d at
99.
State courts are free to render judgements on local causes of action and to find
facts which would logically void the patent in an appropriate suit in the federal
courts. Such findings in a state court action for fraud and disparagement do not
void the patent, although a federal court may at a later time apply the doctrine of
collateral estoppel and declare the patent void.
Id.
34 See, e.g., MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (stating that suit seeking determination of inventorship and co-ownership "arises
under" federal patent laws); Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
557, 560 (Pa. C.P. 1983) (barring state courts from correcting inventorship of patent under
35 U.S.C. § 256), affd in part, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
" See, e.g., Superior Clay Corp. v. Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n, 215 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ohio
C.P. 1963) (recognizing that state courts lack jurisdiction over counterclaim for patent
infringement).
11 See infra part II (discussing sources of uncertainty in patent assignment remedy).
'7 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1250 (Fed. Cir.) (directing defendant
to assign patents embodying misappropriated invention to true inventor), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 853 (1989).
" Donald S. Chisum, The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 128 F.R.D. 409, 566 (1989). In reaching its deci-
sion, the Suzuki court relied on cases that did not determine that the patents being as-
signed contained inventorship defects. See Suzuki, 868 F.2d at 1249; see, e.g., Becher v.
Contoure Lab., Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230
F.2d 855, 865 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956); Saco-Lowell Shops v. Reynolds,
141 F.2d 587, 598 (4th Cir. 1944); De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), af'd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960).
For example, in Colgate-Palmolive, where the patents were assigned to the former em-
ployer of the named inventor, the court found that the former employer was entitled to all
rights in the patent applications "since the discovery or invention involved, was made by
[the named inventor] while employed [by the former employer] for the purpose of making
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made an express determination of improper inventorship of the
misappropriated patent, 9 the court did not address the effects of
the inventorship defects on patent validity.40 Additionally, the
Federal Circuit did not consider whether the Supreme Court's
holding in Kennedy should prohibit the assignment of the
patent.4 1
Since federal courts, under clear Supreme Court authority, are
precluded from assigning invalid patents,42 it is submitted that the
Suzuki court erred by ordering the patent assignment. While op-
portunities for correcting inventorship defects may be available, 43 a
patent naming an improper entity is subject to a declaration of
invalidity until corrected.44 Accordingly, since the Federal Circuit
failed to address the inventorship defects before ordering the pat-
ent assignment, the court violated clear Supreme Court authority
by assigning a patent that was subject to a declaration of invalid-
ity.45 While it remains unclear whether federal courts will uni-
formly assign patents to the true inventors as a remedy for misap-
propriation of technology,46 the true inventors should hesitate
it." Colgate-Palmolive, 230 F.2d at 865 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the assigned patent
properly listed the inventive entity. The basis for the assignment was not that the plaintiff
was the actual inventor of the subject matter as in Suzuki, but rather that the defendant
invented the subject matter while under an obligation to assign the invention to his
employer.
"I Suzuki, 868 F.2d at 1249 (finding that it was not "significantly disputed" at trial that
certain claims of defendant's patent improperly claimed invention of plaintiff).
40 Id. at 1249-50.
41 Id.
42 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court view of
assigning invalid patents).
43 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 256 (1988). The Federal Circuit, in Suzuki, did not address
whether the inventorship defects may be corrected in the patent it was assigning. Suzuki,
868 F.2d at 1249 ("The correction of inventorship is an administrative step, and is not
before the court."). For a discussion of correction of such inventorship defects, see infra part
II.
", See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
45 See Kennedy, 128 U.S. at 672 (refusing to assign invalid patent). Although a court
should not question the validity of patent claims that have not been put in issue by the
parties, see supra note 18, it is submitted that the true inventor placed the patent validity
in issue by seeking the patent assignment on the basis that it issued improperly in the name
of the misappropriator, see Suzuki, 868 F.2d at 1249-50.
46 Only one court has followed the Federal Circuit's lead in assigning a patent involving
misappropriated technology. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Tarancon Corp., 742 F. Supp.
1565, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (ordering patent assignment without considering implications of
improper inventorship). In Union Carbide, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a former
employee, misappropriated its trade secret in a patent filed by the defendant and others. Id.
at 1579.
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before requesting such relief where the patent has issued in the
name of an improper entity.
II. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY CORRECTIVE PROVISIONS TO
THE INVENTORSHIP DEFECTS FOUND IN PATENTS BASED ON
MISAPPROPRIATED TECHNOLOGY
A. Development of the Statutory Inventorship Correction
Provisions
A patent that names a misappropriator or another improper
inventive entity is invalid unless the inventorship defect may be
corrected pursuant to statutory procedures.47 As originally enacted,
however, the patent law provisions affording opportunities for cor-
recting inventorship defects were limited to applications filed by
joint inventors.48 The legislature did not contemplate complete
changes in inventorship, thus a court could not substitute the
name of the true inventor for the improperly named entity when
no joint inventorship existed.49 Indeed, it had been a fundamental
principle of patent law that errors in inventorship could not be
corrected when the patent application initially failed to name at
least one true inventor.5 0
"I See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988) ("Whenever through error a person is named in an appli-
cation for patent as the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an applica-
tion, and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the ... application..
[may] be amended ... ."); 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1988).
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inven-
tor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error
arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the Commissioner may . . .
issue[ ] a certificate correcting such error.
The error of omitting inventors or naming persons who are not inventors shall
not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it can be corrected as
provided in this section.
Id.
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1954) (correcting inventorship errors where "a person is joined
in an application for patent as joint inventor... or [where] a joint inventor is not included
in an application through error .... ") (emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1954) (correcting
inventorship errors of issued patents "issued on the application of persons as joint inven-
tors") (emphasis added).
41 See Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Products Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 101 (W.D. Mo. 1973)
(stating that § 256 is limited to situations involving true joint inventorship and "does not
contemplate or permit what would amount to substitution of one inventor entity for another
under the guise of 'correction' ").
60 See 2 ADELMAN, supra note 22, § 2.10[2.-4], at 2-1185 (stating "black letter law"
proposition that failure to name any correct inventors in application as filed may not be
1156
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Despite the absence of express statutory authorization for
achieving complete inventorship substitutions, 1 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in the landmark decision
of A.F. Stoddard v. Dann,52 held that correction of inventorship
defects requiring complete substitution of the named entity could
be permitted under certain circumstances. 3 The Stoddard holding,
however, has been limited to circumstances in which the patent
application was initially filed by an assignee or other true party in
interest.5
4
corrected); see also Daus, supra note 19, at 130 (stating "generally accepted concept" that
failure to name any correct inventors in application as filed may not be corrected); John L.
Welch, Stoddard v. Dann - Fundamental Principles from A to C, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
185, 185 (1979) (same).
51 A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (recognizing that
"[n]o statutory provision expressly authorizes the requested correction") (Markey, C.J., sit-
ting by designation); see also 4 KAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-5 to 16-6. Cases I and V,
where a true inventor is not initially named, require correction by means of a complete
substitution of the named entity. Id.
52 564 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Markey, C.J., sitting by designation).
13 Stoddard, 564 F.2d at 564-65. The court found that on the facts before it the consti-
tutional objective of granting patents to the true inventor could only be served by permit-
ting the requested correction. Id. at 562. Additionally, the court was persuaded by the ab-
sence in the patent statute of any express prohibition of substituting the inventive entity
represented by one signature for another inventive entity represented by another signature.
Id. at 565. Furthermore, the court believed that other sections of the patent statute, 35
U.S.C. §§ 116-118, contemplate situations where the signatures of the true inventive entity
may be incorrect or entirely absent. Id. at 564-65.
Despite its "revolutionary nature," the Stoddard holding has been said to be firmly
grounded upon fundamental principles: the "constitutional directive to secure to inventors
their patents; the basic requirement of equity and justice; and the need to promote candor
and honesty in Patent Office dealings." Welch, supra note 50, at 185-86.
" See Paul T. Meiklejohn, Misjoinder, Non-joinder, and Whatever - Stoddard v.
Dann, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 487, 501-02 (1978).
[T]he holding in Stoddard is an extremely limited one. It would apply only when
(a) a sole actual inventor is to be substituted for a sole original signatory who is
not an inventor of that subject matter, (b) the sole original signatory is a true
party in interest in the application, (c) the inventorship error was made inno-
cently and without deceptive intention, and (d) the error was corrected by diligent
action upon its discovery.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); accord In re Shibata, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 780,
782 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademark 1979) (adopting Meiklejohn's reasoning); Daus, supra note
19, at 138 (noting Stoddard opinion "narrowly limited" to where application had been filed
by a true party in interest); see also Welch, supra note 50, at 212 (noting that Stoddard
holding provides a "narrow exception" to prior rule).
The Stoddard holding has been viewed to be limited in this manner because the court
emphasized that the application was filed by an assignee of the true inventor who was a true
party in interest. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra, at 501-02. The Stoddard court expressly
stated that it was not dealing with a non-assigned application or with an assigned applica-
tion in which the assignee has no interest received from the true inventor. Stoddard, 564
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The inventorship correction provisions of the patent statute
were subsequently amended in 1982 to "enlarge the possibilities
for correcting misnamed inventive entities. 5 5 These sections now
permit, in addition to adding or deleting joint inventors, the sub-
stitution of a true inventor for the originally named sole inventor,
thereby embracing the Stoddard holding.56
Although the amended provisions arguably contemplate cor-
rection of patents improperly naming only a misappropriator as
the inventor, it is submitted that the inconsistent judicial interpre-
tations regarding the requirements for correction5 7 and the limited
circumstances under which these provisions may be invoked5"
should give a true inventor reason to be cautious in relying on
them for relief.59 While the amended provisions no longer expressly
preclude the substitution of the named inventor, 0 significant ob-
stacles"' remain that may foreclose the true inventor from cor-
recting the inventorship of the patent and, more importantly, from
receiving any value from the patent assignment.
B. Statutory Requirements- Correction of "Errors" Arising
"Without Deceptive Intent"
Correction is available under the statutory provisions only
F.2d at 565 n.11. Since the applications were filed by the assignee, a true party in interest in
the application, who was capable of recognition by the Patent Office, the applications were
not a nullity under any statutory provision. Id. at 565.
" See H.R. Rap. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
765, 773.
66 See id. (stating correction permitted to substitute true inventor for erroneously
named person if error occurred without any deceptive intention on part of true inventor);
see also Edward V. Filardi & Klaus P. Stoffel, Substantive Aspects of the Patent Law
Amendments-1980 to 1985, 24 PAT. L. ANN. § 1.03, at 1-6 (1986) (noting 1982 amendment
permits substitution of sole inventor for improperly named inventor where there was no
deceptive intent); see also In re Bennet, 766 F.2d 524, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting 1982
amendment "embraces" Stoddard holding); Filardi & Stoffel, Substantive Aspects, supra, §
1.03, at 1-6 (noting 1982 amendment "comports" with Stoddard holding). But see Rawlplug
Co., Inc. v. Hilti Aktiengesellschaft, 777 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that §
256 does not allow correction of patents by substitution of true sole inventor for named sole
inventor).
See infra part ILB.
See infra part II.C.
' See Tresansky, supra note 4, at 553 (noting inconsistent interpretations of expres-
sions "misjoinder," "nonjoinder," and "error without deceptive intent").
11 Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 256 (1988) (as amended), supra note 47, with 35 U.S.C.
§§ 116, 256 (1954) (as enacted, in pertinent part), supra note 48.
01 See infra part ll.B-C. for a discussion of the obstacles to correcting inventorship
defects in the misappropriation context.
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where the inventorship defect was the result of an "error" that
arose "without any deceptive intention. 6 2 Although courts have
differed in their interpretations of "error, '' 3 it has consistently
been held that these corrective provisions are not applicable to sit-
uations involving fraud or deliberate deceit in the naming of an
inventor." Under the traditional view, in which "error" is equated
with "inadvertence, accident or mistake,"' deliberate acts were re-
peatedly held to be uncorrectable errors of judgment.6 " More re-
cent cases have expanded the interpretation of "error" to include
good faith mistakes of judgment. 7 All of the cases suggest, how-
62 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 256 (1988); see also infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text
(discussing inconsistent judicial interpretation of "error"); infra notes 70-73 and accompa-
nying text (discussing inconsistent judicial interpretation of phrase "without deceptive
intention").
63 See 4 KAYTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-37 (noting that "most significant contro-
versy" has been interpretation of term "error").
" See Bemis v. Chevron Research Co., 599 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir.) (explaining that §
256 is limited in effect and can only be used as vehicle to correct innocent errors involving
joint inventors), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 966 (1979); Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 786, 817 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (asserting that § 256 "does not deal with fraud on
the [Patent Office]"); Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.A., 494 F. Supp. 370, 387 (D. Del.
1980) (noting that intentional or fraudulent acts not correctable under § 256) (dictum),
aff'd, 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); H.K. Porter Co. v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 414 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 1177 (7th
Cir. 1975) (stating that Congress did not intend to include intentionally false oaths among
"errors" that may be corrected under § 256) (dictum).
5 See John Blue Co., Inc. v. Dempster Mill Mfg. Co., 172 F. Supp. 23, 29, 31 (D. Neb.
1958) (noting that for error to be correctable, it must be unintentional or inadvertent), aff'd,
275 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1960); see also S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2400 (stating that correction permitted under § 116
when a joint inventor has been "inadvertently erroneously included, or.. . excluded") (em-
phasis added); id. at 2401 (noting that § 256 permits a "bona fide mistake . .. to be
corrected").
68 See, e.g., Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Products Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 101-02 (W.D. Mo.
1973) (explaining that "error" does not include "defects resulting from deliberate decisions,
intentional courses of misconduct or gross negligence in avoidance of correction on the part
of responsible knowledgeable parties having full notice of the facts and their legal signifi-
cance") (citing John Blue Co., 172 F. Supp. 23); Kraftco Corp. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 342 F.
Supp. 1361, 1372, 1383 (D.N.J. 1971) (holding that "deliberate and calculated determination
made after a complete investigation of the inventorship" is not "error"); see also Ashlow
Ltd. v. Morgan Constr. Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 671, 696-97 (D.S.C. 1982) (following Rival).
But see Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 653, 655-56 (D. Kan.
1990) (interpreting Rival to "exclude from the definition of 'error' only those actions which
are taken (or not taken) to avoid correction after the inventors, their employers, and/or
their attorneys become aware that the patent or patent application is incorrect").
67 See In re Schmidt, 293 F.2d 274, 279 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (interpreting "error" to include
good faith mistakes of judgment); accord Azoplate Corp. v. Silverlith, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 711,
729 (D. Del. 1973) (asserting that "gross but innocent misunderstanding" by attorney of
inventorship law was "error"), affd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914
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ever, that the inventorship correction provisions are intended to
remedy only innocent errors e8 and bona fide mistakes.6 9
Additionally, the "deceptive intention"70  of an improperly
named inventor, such as a misappropriator, may preclude correc-
tion, even where the actions of the true inventor are completely
innocent.7 1 The statutory language of the corrective provisions in-
dicates that the deceptive intent of the person erroneously named
as the inventor, as well as the erroneously omitted inventor, should
be considered. 2 Accordingly, it is uncertain whether a court would
overlook the deceptive intent of the misappropriator in order to
allow correction of the assigned patent to an innocent true inven-
tor." A misappropriator, who is solely responsible for prosecuting
(1975); see also Upjohn Co. v. Medtron Laboratories, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (indicating that deliberate act such as mistake in legal judgment as to who should be
named inventor can be "error"), aff'd, 937 F.2d 622 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
" See Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 817 n.16 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (asserting that § 256 provides a remedy only for "innocent errors where the name of
an inventor was inadvertently deleted or joined"); see also Stoddard, 564 F.2d at 564 n.10
(noting that Patent Office must assure itself of presence of "innocent error" before permit-
ting substitution); U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Norton Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 187, 189
(N.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting that § 256 "is meant to allow the correction of honest mistakes");
H.R. RE . No. 542, supra note 55, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 773 (stating that
there must be presence of "innocent error").
" See S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 65, at 150, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2401
(indicating that § 116 permits correction of "bona fide mistakes").
70 See 4 KAYTON ETr AL., supra note 6, at 16-39. Deceptive intention is established where
it is shown that the naming of the inventive entity was done deliberately, with an ulterior
purpose or motive. Id.
"' See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
72 See 35 U.S.C. §§116, 256 (1988), supra note 47; see also H. Ross Workman, Determi-
nation of Inventorship-A Clouded Crystal Ball, 20 PAT. L. ANN. 217, 237 (1982) (§§ 116
and 256 explicitly state that the "party seeking to be added or deleted as an inventor must
not have had any deceptive intention") (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 256 (1988) and In re
Searles, 422 F.2d 431, 437 (C.C.P.A. 1970)) (emphasis added); 4 KAYTON ET AL., supra note
6, at 16-41 (noting that antecedent basis for "his" in statutory language is person errone-
ously named as inventor or person erroneously omitted as inventor).
" See General Elec. Co. v. Brandon, No. 92-CV-438, 1992 WL 394933, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.)
(acknowledging that § 256 "does not provide any guidance as to whose intentions are at
issue); 1 CHIsuM, supra note 3, § 2.04[4][c], at 2-45 (noting that §§ 116 and 256 fail to
resolve issue of who must lack deceptive intent); see also In re Shibata, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
780, 783 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademark 1979) (looking to true inventor and improperly named
person for deceptive intent in a case seeking substitution) (emphasis added); Eldon Indus.,
Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 817 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that errors are
correctable only "where 'such error arose without deceptive intention' on the part of the
named inventor") (emphasis added).
In General Electric, the court noted that, at a minimum, the person originally named as
the inventor must lack deceptive intent. General Electric, 1992 WL 394933, at *2. One com-
mentator, however, has suggested that as between the true inventor and the improperly
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the patent, is unlikely to have made a full disclosure.74 The misap-
propriator may not be aware of all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the invention and, moreover, has committed at least
one fraud on the Patent Office. In light of the public's interest in
full disclosure,7 5 it is submitted that courts should focus on the
deceptive intent of the misappropriator as well as that of the true
inventor.
C. Circumstances in Which True Inventors May Be Substituted
for Improperly Named Entities
A significant uncertainty remains as to whether a court will
ever allow correction of the inventorship of a patent that requires a
complete substitution of the true inventor for a named inventor
who is not a true party in interest.76 This uncertainty stems, in
part, from a lack of guidance from Congress regarding the appro-
priate circumstances under which inventorship substitutions will
be permitted under sections 116 and 256 .7 Notwithstanding this
confusion, the amendments have been said to "embrace" the Stod-
dard view, which limits inventorship substitutions to instances in
which the application was filed by a true party in interest.78
Indeed, every court that has permitted an inventorship substi-
tution has first assured itself that the filing of the application was
effected by a true party in interest.7 These courts have been satis-
fied that the "true party in interest" applicant, having a stake in
the outcome, provides a complete and accurate disclosure of the
invention, which is critical for maintaining a valid patent.80 Ac-
named inventor, the better practice is to focus only on the deceptive intent of the true
inventor. 1 CHISUM supra note 3, § 2.04[4] [c], at 2-46. Chisum believes that the "[d]eception
by the misjoined person... should not affect the rights of the true inventor." Id. However,
this view has never been expressly adopted by any court.
74 See infra note 97 (discussing disclosure).
75 See infra note 101.
76 See supra note 54 (discussing true party in interest limitation).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 542, supra note 55, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 773.
The only guidance provided by the legislative history is an indication that when "the error
occurred without any deceptive intention on the part of the true inventor," the Commis-
sioner is authorized to substitute the true inventor for the erroneously named person. Id.
78 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
79 See Stoddard, 564 F.2d at 565; In re Bennet, 766 F.2d 524, 527-28 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(looking to Stoddard as primary precedent for allowing requested inventorship substitu-
tion); see also In re Shibata, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 780, 783 (Comm'r Pat. & Trademark
1979) (finding named inventor was true party in interest).
11 See Welch, supra note 50, at 206-08 (asserting that disclosure submitted by true
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cordingly, it is submitted that the "true party in interest" limita-
tion, ensuring a more complete and accurate disclosure, comports
with the historical development of these provisions."' It must be
noted, however, that such a construction places an insurmountable
obstacle before true inventors attempting to correct inventorship
defects in the typical misappropriation context.
D. What Can Be Learned From Earlier Cases Requesting Cor-
rection in Presence of Misappropriation and Fraud?
The few courts that have addressed the availability of in-
ventorship correction in cases of misappropriation and fraud have
indicated that correction is not available to substitute the true in-
ventive entity for the names of persons who misappropriated the
invention.8 2 In Bemis v. Chevron Research Co.,8 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "[s]ection 256, though remedial in character, is lim-
ited in effect and cannot properly be the vehicle for substituting
inventors on a patent in a claim sounding in conspiracy and
fraud.""4 While the aspects of the court's analysis of possible sub-
stitution of inventors may be questioned in view of the 1982
amendments,"8 the court's holding that section 256 is inapplicable
to conspiracy and fraud is well reasoned 6 and remains good law.87
party in interest is as reliable as those permitted under §§ 116-118); see also Stoddard, 564
F.2d at 563 (acknowledging that the public is entitled to complete and accurate disclosure
which is quid pro quo for patent rights).
81 See supra part II.A.
82 See Bemis v. Chevron Research Co., 599 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir.) (holding that § 256
does not allow substitution of inventors in presence of conspiracy and fraud), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 966 (1979); General Elec. Co. v. Brandon, No. 92-CV-438, 1992 WL 394933, at *2
(N.D.N.Y.) (following Bemis); 2 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FuNDAMNTALs § 11.03,
at 11-18. (2d ed. 1992) (cannot substitute name of true inventor for name of person who
stole invention) (citing Bemis); see also Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp.
786, 817 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (asserting that § 256 "does not deal with fraud on [Patent
Office]"); Dee v. Aukerman, 625 F. Supp. 1427, 1431 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (noting difficulty rec-
onciling requirement under § 256 of error "without any deceptive intention" and theory of
deprivation).
85 599 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 966 (1979).
84 Id. at 912. In Bemis, the plaintiff alleged that he was the true sole inventor of a
patent and sought a corrected patent naming him as the only true inventor. Id. at 911.
85 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. But see Paul T. Meiklejohn, Stoddard
v. Dann Revisited, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 575, 579 (1980) (suggesting that Bemis court must
have either disagreed with Stoddard authority for substitution or not found it controlling
since Stoddard was presented to Bemis court).
88 See 2 ADELMAN, supra note 22, § 2.10[2.-7], at 2-1205 (stating that Bemis court "no
doubt correctly concluded" that § 256 does not apply to claims of conspiracy and fraud).
87 See General Elec. Co. v. Brandon, No. 92-CV-438, 1992 WL 394933, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.)
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Indeed, courts that have addressed cases similar to Bemis, in-
volving misappropriation and other tortious conduct, have been
unable to reconcile such conduct with the requirement in section
256 that the error arose "without any deceptive intention." 85 5 More-
over, the perpetration of any type of fraud on the Patent Office, be
it by a misappropriator or a true inventor, can invalidate the pat-
ent. 9 Thus, it is suggested that even where a true inventor success-
fully persuades a court to order a substitution of his name for the
name of the misappropriator, the true inventor has merely effected
the transfer of a nullity. Although the inventorship correction pro-
visions are remedial in nature, 0 the history of the corrective provi-
sions and their attendant case law indicate that correction of in-
ventorship defects arising in the misappropriation context are
beyond the scope of relief contemplated by Congress in enacting
the inventorship correction provisions.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR REMEDYING MISAPPROPRIATION
OF TECHNOLOGY WHERE THE MISAPPROPRIATED TECHNOLOGY HAS
BEEN CLAIMED IN A PATENT
A. Patent Based Remedies
While the inventorship correction provisions apparently fail to
provide a true inventor with a means for obtaining title to a relia-
bly valuable patent,91 the true inventor is not barred from "secur-
(following Bemis); Rawlplug Co. v. Hilti Aktiengesellschaft, 777 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y
1991) (discussing Bemis holding that "Section 256 cannot be used to substitute one sole
inventor for another"); Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 817 n.16
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing Bemis for proposition that § 256 may only be applied to correct
innocent, inadvertent errors).
1 See Dee v. Aukerman, 625 F. Supp. 1427 (S.D. Ohio 1986). In Dee, the plaintiff
sought to be named as a joint inventor some years after the issuance of a patent which was
obtained through alleged tortious means. Id. at 1430. In disposing of a procedural matter,
the court noted that it had "considerable difficulty in squaring a theory of deprivation" with
the requirement under § 256 that the error arose "without any deceptive intention." Id. at
1431. See also McSherry v. Giannuzzi, 717 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y.) (struggling with
same difficulties as court in Dee in attempting to reconcile claim under § 256 with tort
theory), appeal denied, 889 F.2d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(d) (1991).
91 See, e.g, In re Bennet, 766 F.2d 524, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that legislative
history of § 256 makes clear its "remedial intent"); Patterson v. Hauck, 341 F.2d 131, 138
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (noting that § 256 is remedial provision and should be liberally construed);
see also Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 357 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "amendments
under § 116 and conversion of inventorship should be liberally allowed").
" See supra part II.
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ing" the patent rights to his invention. 2 The central dispute to be
resolved between the true inventor and a misappropriator requires
a determination of "priority of invention," or who actually con-
ceived the invention."' The patent statute provides a mechanism
for resolving such inventorship contests by means of an interfer-
ence proceeding in the Patent Office. 4 A true inventor, by filing
his own patent application in the Patent Office within one year of
the issuance of the misappropriator's patent," can resolve a claim
of misappropriation through an interference proceeding. 8
Resolution of inventorship disputes by means of the interfer-
82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ...
Discoveries .... ).
" See generally McCARTHY, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 262. The first inventor has
"priority of invention over others who invented the same patentable concept." Id. Accord-
ingly, the inventor with priority will be granted the patent. Id. To establish priority, the
true inventor will have to establish reduction to practice prior to the filing date of the mis-
appropriator, or "conception before that date coupled with reasonable diligence" up to the
true inventor's filing date. See Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting
Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
It is unclear whether courts will allow the inventorship correction provisions, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 116, 256 (1988), to be used to resolve inventorship contests without resort to an interfer-
ence proceeding, particularly where inventorship is disputed between two sole "inventors."
Compare MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(holding that § 256 provides jurisdiction for resolving joint inventorship dispute among con-
tending coinventors), with Rawlplug Co. v. Hilti Aktiengesellschaft, 777 F. Supp. 240, 243
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that § 256 does not allow correction by substitution of true sole
inventor for named sole inventor). See generally 1 CHIsUM, supra note 3, at § 2.04[7], at 2-
54 (noting question of whether §§ 116 and 256 alone can resolve inventorship disputes).
See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1988). See generally Floyd H. Crews & Maurice A. Crews, In-
troduction to Interference Law and Practice, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 755 (1964) (discussing
substantive and procedural aspects of interferences).
While interference proceedings typically involve competing claims to priority based on
independent discovery of the same invention, interferences may also involve a claim based
on derivation. See 1 CHisUM, supra note 3, § 2.04[7], at 2-52. In this manner, one party in
the interference may allege that the other party misappropriated the concept of the inven-
tion from him. Id.; see also In re Cooper, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 638, 639 (Comm'r Pat. &
Trademark 1985) ("Where, as here, a person believes that he is the inventor of subject mat-
ter claimed in the application or patent of another, his remedy is to file an application, if he
can, and provoke an interference with the other application or patent.").
" See 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (1988) ("A claim which is the same as . ..a claim of an
issued patent may not be made in any application unless such a claim is made prior to one
year from the date on which the patent was granted.").
"8 See Buonaiuto, supra note 5, at 445-46 (noting that it is often the case in an interfer-
ence proceeding that a party alleges that a second party derived the invention from the
first); see also 1 CassuM, supra note 3, § 2.04[7], at 2-52 (observing that interference pro-
ceeding may involve claim of derivation). But see Suzuki, 868 F.2d at 1250 (disagreeing that
true inventor limited to interference remedy for resolution of misappropriation).
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ence proceeding, requiring each party to file independent patent
applications, encourages the complete and accurate -disclosure of
the invention by the true inventor, including the "best mode" con-
templated by the inventor for carrying out his invention.9 7 On the
other hand, resolution by means of the inventorship correction
provisions, when successful,98 will merely place the name of the
true inventive entity on a patent that has issued based on the
questionable disclosure of the misappropriator e9 Because of this
disparity in disclosure, it is submitted that the interference remedy
provides a more preferable mechanism for resolving inventorship
disputes involving claims of misappropriation than does the in-
ventorship correction provisions, from the point of view of both the
true inventor 00 and the public. 10 1
97 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). A patent disclosure should enable others to understand
the invention and enable further development of the technology. See MCCARTHY, ENCYCLO-
PEDIA, supra note 4, at 102-03. Additionally, since the public is entitled to make and use the
invention upon the expiration of the patent, they are "entitled to a full and complete disclo-
sure of how to do so." Id. at 103.
There are three requirements under § 112 that the patent disclosure must satisfy to
maintain patent validity. See id. at 29. The first requirement, the "description require-
ment," requires a description of the claimed invention. Id. The second requirement, referred
to as "enablement," requires that the description must be sufficiently full, clear, and concise
so as to "enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention." Id. Finally, to
satisfy the "best mode" requirement, the "description must be of the best embodiment
known to the inventor at the time of the patent application." Id.
While the enablement requirement looks to placing the invention in the possession of
the public, the best mode requirement imposes an obligation that the true inventor disclose
the "best mode ... of carrying out the invention." Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc.,
827 F.2d 1524, 1532 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987); see also Dana Corp. v.
IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 418 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (observing that best mode require-
ment serves to ensure that the public obtains a "full disclosure of the preferred embodiment
of the invention"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
' See supra part U.
' See Meiklejohn, supra note 54, at 498 (acknowledging that applications filed by
other than true inventor have "very little" reliability as to accuracy of disclosure); cf. Welch,
supra note 50, at 206 (suggesting that true inventor is in best position to provide accurate
disclosure).
100 See Meiklejohn, supra note 54, at 499 (suggesting that even when patent is cor-
rected by inventorship provisions, it may still be invalid due to deficiencies in disclosure
that violate enablement and best mode requirements). Additionally, there is no guarantee
that these deficiencies would be detected by the Patent Office Examiner before issuing the
patent to the misappropriator. Id. Therefore, it is suggested that when the true inventor
attempts to enforce his patent against an infringer, the patent validity may be challenged on
these grounds. The grounds for invalidity do not require intent to deceive the public, but
rather invalidity is the result of a failure of consideration, since the public was entitled,
upon expiration of the exclusive patent privilege, to practice the adequately disclosed inven-
tion. HARMON, supra note 2, § 5.2, at 116.
A further consideration that should be addressed by true inventors before seeking reso-
1993] 1165
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1147
While it is recognized that resolution of misappropriation dis-
putes by means of the interference procedure may deprive some
true inventors of a patent remedy where the existence of the pat-
ent based on the misappropriated technology is not discovered by
the true inventor for more than one year after its issuance, 0 2 it is
suggested that the public, including true inventors, are presumed
to have notice of the issuance of the patent.03 Furthermore, if this
one-year statutory period is viewed as providing true inventors
lution by means of the inventorship correction provisions is the potential limitations placed
on the scope of the patent by the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel. See generally McCAR-
THY, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 128. The "file wrapper" of a patent consists of the
contents of the application along with any amendments made by the applicant in prosecut-
ing a patent application. RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW--A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 139
(1988). Patent applicants submit amendments to their applications after the Patent Office
inspects the claim and cites prior art references. See 4 LnPscoM, supra note 6, § 12:7, at 25.
These references alert the applicant to the existence of prior art which affects the patenta-
bility of the invention. See 4 id. at 26; see also 2 id. § 6:29, at 130 ("[P]rior art is all of that
knowledge that would have been available to any person having ordinary skill in the art.").
If in prosecuting the patent application the Patent Office relied on statements of the
misappropriator that narrowed the scope of the claim to avoid cited prior art references, the
true inventor will be precluded under the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel from later ob-
taining a claim construction that resurrects the surrendered subject matter. McCARTHY, EN-
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 128; Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 720 F.2d
1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
101 See Stoddard, 564 F.2d at 563. The public is entitled to a complete and accurate
disclosure. Id. (noting that quid pro quo for patent is requirement of full disclosure of in-
vention). Accordingly, it is submitted that the public interest in accurate disclosure of in-
ventions is best served by resolving claims of misappropriation and derivation by means of
the interference proceeding, which requires the true inventor to fully and accurately disclose
his invention in his own independent patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1988); see
also supra note 97 and accompanying text. Further, by allowing resolution by means of the
inventorship correction provisions, which furthers the possibility of technically incorrect or
inoperative disclosures, the policy of exponential technological development underlying the
disclosure requirement would be frustrated. Cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 54, at 498.
102 See supra note 95. An application for patent is also defeated when the invention has
been "described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent." 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
If a misappropriator defeats the true inventor's patent rights by a publication or public
use of the invention, rather than by the filing of a patent application, the true inventor will
be left without an opportunity for obtaining his own patent after the one-year statutory
period has expired. Id. It is submitted that the case of the inventor's patent rights being
defeated by the issuance of a patent to the misappropriator should be treated the same as
when the patent rights were violated by publication or public use of the invention by the
misappropriator without the inventor's consent.
101 See, e.g., Wise v. Hubbard, 769 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that issuance of
patent and recordation in Patent Office is notice to world of its existence); Advanced Car-
diovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 1872 (D.
Minn. 1991) (noting the "established law" that patent issuance constitutes notice).
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with an insufficient amount of time for filing their own patent ap-
plications, then the solution lies with congressional extension of
this period, not in judicial misuse of the correction procedures to
accomplish results unintended by Congress.
B. Non-patent Based Remedies
A true inventor whose invention was confidentially disclosed
to a defendant, and thereafter misappropriated by the defendant,
is not confined to the procedures provided by the patent laws to
obtain relief.104 Very often, the true inventor's development may
qualify for trade secret protection. 105 As a result, the true inventor
may be entitled to recover damages for the wrongful use and ac-
quisition of his trade secrets by the misappropriator. 106 Similarly,
damages may be available to the true inventor for the loss of the
trade secret caused by the misappropriator's publication of the
trade secret in the form of an issued patent.10 7 The appropriate
measure of damages in such a case would be the market value of
the trade secrets at the time of the publication, °08 which takes into
account the investment value of the trade secret as well. 09 There-
fore, even though the true inventor may be precluded from a rem-
edy under the patent laws for obtaining title to the patents based
on the misappropriated invention, he may still recover for the use
and loss of the exclusive right to the invention.110
104 Friedman v. Washburn Co., 145 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1944).
105 See 2 LipscoM:, supra note 6, § 8:2, at 477-83 (discussing inventor's patent rights in
relation to trade secrets). A trade secret consists of business information that has been kept
confidential and possesses value because it is not commonly known. See generally McCAR-
THY, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 344-48; see also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)
(1985) (defining "trade secret"); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939) (same).
Trade secrets are "protected against those who obtain access through improper methods or
by a breach of confidence." McCARTHY, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 4, at 344.
100 See Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 388-89 (D. Md.
1963). Such relief may be independently awarded or coupled with injunctive relief. See Tri-
tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1975).
107 See Precision Plating & Metal Finishing, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 435 F.2d
1262, 1263 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1002 (1971).
108 Id.
109 Id. The investment value is measured by what an investor judges he would pay for
the trade secret, taking into account the facts, circumstances and information that is availa-
ble at the time. Id. It should be noted that courts are not afraid to speculate rather large
amounts in the realm of patent law. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1714 (D. Mass. 1991) (awarding over $873,000,000 in damages).
110 See, e.g., Carter Prods., 214 F. Supp. at 388-89.
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CONCLUSION
Until the boundaries of the inventorship correction provisions
are more clearly established, the patent reassignment remedy re-
mains intolerably uncertain. Given the deficiencies inherent in a
patent procured by a misappropriator, attempted reassignment of
such patents provides a less than adequate remedy to true inven-
tors. In view of the uncertainty and inadequacy of the patent reas-
signment remedy, as well as the public's interest in furthering full
and adequate disclosure of inventions, the use of interference pro-
ceedings should be the preferred mechanism for resolving inventor-
ship disputes involving claims of derivation or misappropriation. It
is hoped that this critique of the patent reassignment remedy will
caution true inventors who might otherwise pursue such an avenue
of relief, and it is further hoped that the approach suggested will
assist true inventors in "securing" more reliable and definite rights
to their discoveries.
Kevin M. Mason
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